In Weekes v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2025] FCA 1549 (Weekes), the Federal Court confirmed that the ACCC is not under a statutory duty—express or implied—to decide whether to address consumer complaints it receives, with the result that inaction in response to such a complaint is not amenable to review by a court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). This bars complainants from compelling the ACCC to respond to individual complaints and accords with the regulator’s practice of prioritising matters consistent with its enforcement priorities.
What happened?
In September 2020, the Applicant, Mr Weekes, lodged an online complaint with the ACCC alleging false claims by a funeral business. In July 2021, an internal ACCC “Round Table” determined that no further action would be taken because the matter was not a priority, the information did not warrant investigation, it concerned an individual or localised dispute, and aspects of it fell outside the ACCC’s remit as they related to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). In July and December 2023, the ACCC advised Mr Weekes that the Australian Human Rights Commission was better placed to consider certain issues and that “no further response will be provided”. In April 2024, the Acting CEO reiterated to Mr Weekes in correspondence that the ACCC is “an economy wide regulator” that prioritises matters with the “widest impact or greatest benefit”, stated it would “not provide any further comment”, and referred the complainant to the Commonwealth Ombudsman. In February 2025, the Applicant sent the ACCC a submission titled “Submission: ACCC Structural Bias in Adjudicating Consumer Law Complaints”, asserting “a structural bias within the ACCC’s regulatory enforcement framework, not an administrative process failure” and requested “formal acknowledgement” from the ACCC. The submission cited no specific statutory provision or power, and the ACCC did not reply, however the Court inferred that the ACCC read and filed the submission.
Mr Weekes commenced proceedings in June 2025. He contended, by necessary implication of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), that:
- the ACCC had a duty to decide whether to address his submission alleging structural bias,
- the asserted bias prevented the ACCC from lawfully discharging its statutory functions,
- more than four months without a decision constituted unreasonable delay under s 7(1) of the ADJR Act, and
- he was aggrieved on public interest grounds.
Mr Weekes sought declarations that the ACCC had a duty to make the abovementioned decision and had failed to do so.
What did the Court say?
The question for the Court was whether the CCA required or authorised the ACCC to decide whether to address the Applicant’s February 2025 submission. If so, not making that decision would constitute a “failure to make a decision … under an enactment” (s 7(1)) and be a “decision to which [the ADJR Act] applies” within s 3(1).
The Court applied the two-limb test in Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99:
- the impugned decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by statute; and
- the decision itself must confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, such that it derives from the statute.
The Court held that:
- firstly, nothing in the CCA (or any related statute) required or authorised a decision on whether to address the Applicant’s February 2025 submission. The Applicant’s argument that this could be implied from the statutory scheme was too remote, particularly given the submission was framed as one of “structural bias”; and
- secondly, the alleged duty to decide could not be tied to any substantive power under the CCA the exercise of which would affect legal rights or obligations.
As a result, the Court’s AD(JR) Act jurisdiction was not engaged, and it declined to exercise judicial review. The application was dismissed with costs.
What does this mean?
Weekes confirms that, unless a statute requires it or the decision is tied to a power that affects legal rights or obligations, it is up to the ACCC to decide whether to investigate, respond to, or otherwise take further action on a complaint. This is consistent with the ACCC directing its resources to matters aligned with its published enforcement priorities. Complainants cannot use the ADJR Act to compel a response from the ACCC within a set timeframe. The Commonwealth Ombudsman, rather than the courts, is the more appropriate avenue for concerns about the handling of complaints by regulators.